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9I. Executive Summary 
 and Recommendations
Extensive evidence of ethnic discrimination in Russia—particularly the pervasive target-
ing of minorities for document checks by police—led the Open Society Justice Initiative, 
in partnership with JURIX and Lamberth Consulting, to undertake a groundbreaking 
study of ethnic profiling by police in the Moscow Metro system. The Moscow Metro 
Monitoring Study marked the first time the rigorous statistical methodology known 
as observational benchmarking was employed to measure ethnic profiling outside the 
United States and United Kingdom. The study examined whether and to what extent the 
Moscow Metro police disproportionately stopped individuals based on their appearance 
as “Slavs” or “non-Slavs.”
The Moscow Metro Monitoring Study found that persons of non-Slavic appear-
ance made up only 4.6% of the riders on the Metro system but 50.9% of persons 
stopped by the police at Metro exits. In other words, non-Slavs were, on average, 21.8 
times more likely to be stopped than Slavs. At one station, non-Slavs were 85 times more 
likely than Slavs to be stopped by the police. By comparison, the highest rates detected 
in the United States and United Kingdom show that minorities are four or five times 
more likely than non-minorities to be stopped. This disproportion is massive and cannot 
be explained on non-discriminatory, legitimate law enforcement grounds. 
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The Moscow Metro Monitoring Study also analyzed the effectiveness of police 
efforts in stopping non-Slavs at such a disproportionate rate. The results clearly dem-
onstrate that the Moscow police are wasting their effort: in the overwhelming majority 
of instances, police simply release those they have stopped. The study concludes that 
only 3% of police stops resulted in even an administrative infraction such as possessing 
improper documents. This low “hit rate” should be cause for great concern.  
This study was conducted in the context of the Open Society Justice Initiative’s 
ongoing project examining and combating ethnic profiling in Europe. As such, Ethnic 
Profiling in the Moscow Metro begins with an overview of the concept of ethnic profiling 
and the movement to combat the practice, underscoring that the practice is illegal under 
international law. The report then provides context and analysis of the Moscow environ-
ment in which such systematic ethnic profiling occurs. It surveys the domestic legal 
framework governing requirements that Russian citizens and foreigners register their 
permanent residence and temporary stays, as well as the police powers to stop individu-
als for investigation and document checks, concluding that the law is so permissive as to 
allow police officers unbridled discretion to stop any individual for document checks at 
will. Furthermore, the report describes other factors that allow ethnic profiling to occur, 
such as the disproportionate xenophobic reaction to concerns regarding migration and 
terrorist threats, the discriminatory application of residence registration requirements, 
and an ineffective police force known for corruption.
The Moscow Metro Monitoring Study’s findings are clear: the Moscow police 
forces are wasting their efforts by disproportionately targeting non-Slavs for fruitless 
stops and searches. The Moscow police force must re-evaluate how to deploy its limited 
resources in an effective manner that is consistent with its legal obligations to respect 
antidiscrimination norms. To that end, the Justice Initiative and JURIX make the fol-
lowing recommendations:
To the Federal Ministry of the Interior
• Clarify and publicize the objectives of police stops and study current practices of 
stops to assess their effectiveness in achieving the stated objectives. 
• Devise stop-and-search guidelines based on behavior and other objective factors 
rather than on apparent ethnicity. Review internal policies and training on stops 
and searches to eliminate the singular reliance on ethnicity as a criterion for 
stops.
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• Mandate the recording of all stops in writing by patrol officers. Develop and dis-
tribute a standard form for police to record all stops. Require police to provide 
each person stopped with a copy of the written record of the stop, which includes 
an explanation of the reasons for the stop, as well as information on the rights and 
responsibilities of individuals in encounters with the police and on how individu-
als can make a complaint.
 
• Increase police salaries to reduce turnover and improve the competence and pro-
fessionalism of the police forces.   
 
• Design, develop, implement, and publicize an independent and transparent sys-
tem of civilian oversight of the Russian police forces, including the Moscow Metro 
UVD police. 
 
• Design, develop, implement, and publicize an effective system of training of the 
Russian police forces, including the Moscow Metro UVD police, which makes 
clear that ethnic profiling is inappropriate and includes as a substantial compo-
nent training in Russian and international standards on human rights and non-
discrimination.  
• Direct the Office of Internal Security (Upravleniye Sobstvennoy Bezopasnosti) to 
take punitive action against police officers who engage in ethnic profiling or other 
discriminatory practices. 
• Instruct the Moscow Metro UVD to place a notice board in every Metro station 
with information on the rights and responsibilities of individuals in encounters 
with the police and on how individuals can make a complaint. 
To Russian Political Leaders 
and Members of the Duma
 
• Speak out against ethnic discrimination, including ethnic profiling, and extortion 
by the police of ethnic minorities; underscore publicly and repeatedly that the 
fight against crime and terrorism is neither impeded nor aided by discriminatory 
police practices. 
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• Amend all legislative provisions and bylaws that allow patrol police to conduct 
stops for the sole or primary purpose of investigating compliance with the admin-
istrative requirements of residence registration.
• Amend the Administrative Code so that absence of registration is not subject to 
fine. 
• Revise the Law on the Status of the Main Identity Document so that it allows the 
use of any government-issued identification card with a photograph as proof of 
identity.  
 
• Amend the Law on the Police to make clear that stops by police must be supported 
by “reasonable suspicion of an actual or possible offense or crime” as recom-
mended in Article 47 of the European Code of Police Ethics.
To Russian NGOs
 
• Monitor and report on ethnic profiling practices of the police.  
 
• Provide civic education programs to inform the public of their rights when stopped 
by the police and to disseminate information about complaints procedures.
 
• Ensure police accountability by assisting individuals in legal actions and police 
complaints procedures.
 
• Collaborate with the Ministry of the Interior to assist in revising internal adminis-
trative regulations and training procedures concerning stop-and-search practices 
so as to conform with international human rights law, including the prohibition 
against racial and ethnic discrimination. 
To the International Community
 
• Monitor and encourage reform of police practices in Russia to ensure that they 
comply with Russia’s international human rights obligations, including the anti-
discrimination norm.
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• Support more effective police policies and practices through sharing information 
on best practices.
• The various bodies of the Council of Europe, including the Parliamentary Assem-
bly, the Committee of Ministers, and the Commissioner of Human Rights, should 
highlight ethnic profiling and other discriminatory practices by the police as an 
area of particular concern in their monitoring, reporting on, and dialogue with 
the Russian authorities. This is all the more important as the Russian Federation 
currently serves as President of the Committee of Ministers.
• The European Union should similarly highlight ethnic profiling and other dis-
criminatory practices by the police in its continuing dialogue with the Russian 
authorities. 
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II. Introduction
Systemic discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and nationality1 in Russia is well docu-
mented and lies at the heart of myriad human rights violations against minorities.  Rus-
sian media propagates racist stereotypes, fueling hate speech.2 African and East Asian 
students frequently fall victim to racial violence, from assault to murder, at the hands of 
right-wing gangs. Migrant workers, primarily from the Caucasus and Central Asia, are 
exploited and abused. Especially vulnerable are those who are visibly non-Slav, as they 
receive heightened scrutiny from the police as a result of their presumed national origin. 
Few victims of discrimination report assaults or denials of their rights. They have come 
to accept discrimination as the normal state of affairs. Russian police do not effectively 
investigate and prosecute racist violence.
One of the most persistent forms of discrimination against ethnic minorities is 
harassment at the hands of Russian police, who have been widely alleged to dispro-
portionately target minorities for stops and document checks. Nowhere is this practice 
more infamous than in Moscow. But just how widespread is the problem in fact?
Police targeting of minorities in Russia amounts to racial and ethnic profiling, 
defined as the impermissible use of stereotypes based on ethnicity, or perceived ethnic-
ity, by law enforcement personnel in making law enforcement decisions. In the United 
States and United Kingdom, discriminatory targeting of minorities by the police was 
widely accepted and tolerated, until a movement emerged in the 1980s and 1990s to 
combat this problem. What prompted the public outcry to end the practice was statisti-
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cal evidence that both quantified the prevalence of ethnic profiling and also proved that 
ethnic profiling is an ineffective law enforcement tool.  
A recent decision by the European Court of Human Rights, Timishev v. Russia,3 
found Russia in breach of the European Convention of Human Rights for targeting 
Russian citizens of Chechen origin for special restrictions on freedom of movement. 
The case concerned an official order to traffic police officers not to allow “Chechens” to 
cross an internal administrative border within the Russian state. In practice, “the order 
barred the passage not only of any person who actually was of Chechen ethnicity, but 
also of those who were merely perceived as belonging to that ethnic group.”4 As the 
Timishev decision makes clear, ethnic profiling is a violation of European and interna-
tional norms, which are part of the Russian constitutional order.5 
Despite widespread reports of ethnic profiling of minorities in Russia, the preva-
lence of the problem has never been quantified. This report seeks to fill that gap. From 
May 2005 through September 2005, JURIX6 and the Open Society Justice Initiative 
(“Justice Initiative”),7 implemented the Moscow Metro Monitoring Study in conjunction 
with Lamberth Consulting8 to monitor the practices of the Moscow police in conducting 
stops of riders on the Moscow Metro and quantify the prevalence of ethnic profiling. The 
study was born of the convergence of two Justice Initiative programs. First, the Justice 
Initiative has been working with a consortium of Russian human rights NGOs on docu-
menting and litigating cases of ethnic discrimination in the Russian Federation since 
2003. Second, the Justice Initiative is undertaking a comparative study of ethnic profil-
ing in several other European countries, including Spain, Hungary, Bulgaria, France, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden, which will be released as a separate report.  
The Moscow Metro Monitoring Study was a groundbreaking undertaking. It 
marks the first time that the rigorous statistical methodology of benchmarking and 
observational monitoring was used to measure ethnic profiling outside of the United 
States and the United Kingdom. The study scrutinized police stops at the exits of the 
Moscow Metro.  These exits presented an ideal environment in which to conduct the 
benchmark survey measuring the ethnic composition of the population under study to 
determine whether ethnic profiling is occurring. Also, the Moscow Metro system is so 
extensive that its riders represent a cross-section of the population of this expansive city, 
including the downtown district, residential areas, and railway and bus terminals that 
connect to the satellite cities surrounding Moscow.
Unlike ethnic profiling studies in the United States or United Kingdom, the Mos-
cow Metro Monitoring Study was conducted independent of any cooperation from the 
Moscow police. The Moscow police do not currently collect data on the stops of police 
officers and it would take considerable time and resources to institute such a data col-
lection procedure. In this context, undertaking an independent study guaranteed that 
the findings would be objective.
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This report seeks to contextualize the results of the Moscow Metro Monitoring 
Study within the general framework of comparative experience with ethnic profiling 
on the one hand and the unique legal and human rights environment of modern day 
Moscow on the other.
To begin, Section III of this report provides an overview of the concept of eth-
nic profiling and describes the evolution of the movement to combat this practice. It 
explains why ethnic profiling is not an efficient law-enforcement practice and describes 
the international legal norms which render it unlawful. 
Against this backdrop, Section IV discusses both the methodology and results of 
the Moscow Metro Monitoring Study. It starts by describing the highly rigorous meth-
odology developed to conduct the Moscow Metro Monitoring Study, which observed 
and analyzed data collected from over 1,500 police stops at 15 Metro stations from May 
through September 2005. This discussion explains the five elements of the field study 
including the Metro station selection process, the training of monitors, the benchmark-
ing of the population under study, the observational monitoring of stops, and the inter-
views conducted with a selection of those stopped.   
The monitors classified the ethnic data of individuals at the Moscow Metro station 
exits into three categories, namely “Slavs,” defined as those who appeared to be ethnic 
Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians; “minorities,” namely those who appeared to 
be national minorities of the former Soviet Union from the Caucasus and Central Asia; 
and “other.”  It is important to note that the Moscow Metro Monitoring Study developed 
these categories to mimic how the Moscow police are believed to classify the public 
according to physical appearance.
Section IV provides the results of the Moscow Metro Monitoring Study. In sum, 
the study found that while non-Slavs9 composed only 4.6% of the riders on the Metro 
system, they accounted for 50.9% of persons stopped by the police. In other words, 
non-Slavs are on average 21.8 times more likely to be stopped than Slavs. By compari-
son, the highest rates recorded in the United States and United Kingdom demonstrate 
that minorities are four or five times more likely to be stopped by the police than non-
minorities. The rate of disproportionate targeting by the police of non-Slavs revealed in 
this study is the highest ever recorded in a study of ethnic profiling to date. Indeed, the 
rate is so extreme, it is highly unlikely that it can be explained on non-discriminatory, 
legitimate law enforcement grounds. 
Section V examines the legal framework that governs police powers to stop and 
check identity documents in Russia. This analysis surveys both the laws governing resi-
dence registration and identity papers as well as the police structure and criminal and 
administrative procedures that define the contours of police powers to stop individuals 
for investigation.
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Section VI then describes specifics of the Moscow environment in which the 
flagrant ethnic profiling documented by the Moscow Metro Monitoring Study occurs. 
Several legitimate concerns for heightened law enforcement vigilance exist, namely a 
situation of migration and episodic terrorist attacks linked to the ongoing war in Chech-
nya. But the study found that police stops uncover administrative document violations 
only 3% of the time. Such an exceptionally low hit rate belies any justification of ethnic 
targeting for migration and anti-terrorist measures. If ethnic profiling cannot be justi-
fied based on law enforcement rationales, what else could be driving this practice? This 
section proceeds to describe the widespread acceptance of discrimination and xenopho-
bia among the Moscow public and the crisis of today’s police force in Moscow. In light 
of these factors, this section probes the question of whether ethnic profiling, in fact, 
prevails as de facto official policy in Moscow.
The report closes in Section VII with a summary of the Moscow Metro Monitoring 
Study’s conclusion that the Moscow Metro police are engaging in ethnic profiling, an 
unlawful practice that must be addressed.
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III. The Movement to Combat 
 Ethnic Profiling
The Concept of Ethnic Profiling 
and a Methodology to Measure It 
Investigating and preventing crime are core functions of law enforcement. “Profiling” 
refers to the police practice of using a defined set of characteristics or circumstances 
to identify individuals who are likely to engage in criminal conduct. Individuals who 
conform to these characteristics are subjected to stops, searches, investigation, or arrests 
based on their “profile,” rather than an articulable suspicion that they are likely the 
perpetrators of a crime. National and local laws set guidelines and limits under which 
it is lawful for police to stop individuals in public.  
During a stop, police temporarily restrict the movement or liberty of a suspect for 
questioning to investigate any criminal activity. Some laws allow police to go beyond 
questioning and to search individuals for weapons or criminal contraband but require 
that police articulate minimum reasons why they have suspicion to stop and search 
an individual in public.10 Police stops, identity checks, and searches cover a range of 
contacts between the police and the public that form one of the police’s investigative 
powers.
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Engaging in profiling to conduct stops and searches is an accepted and permis-
sible law enforcement tool, provided that profiles are based on factors that are objective 
and statistically proven to be significant indicators of criminal activity. Some profiles 
may provide helpful markers as an aid to law enforcement personnel in identifying key 
traits to look for among a large mass of information or individuals.
The term “ethnic profiling” refers to the impermissible reliance on ethnic and 
racial stereotypes, rather than objectively identified behavioral profiles, as the basis for 
making law enforcement and investigative decisions about who is involved in criminal 
activity.  Such profiling, based on generalizations about race, ethnicity, or national origin 
rather than specific evidence that would link a perpetrator to a crime in a particular place 
at a particular time, can amount to discrimination and is illegal under international and 
regional standards and some national laws. Police are not engaging in ethnic profiling 
when ethnicity is part of a suspect-specific and time-bound description.
Although the reality of discriminatory police profiling of ethnic and racial minori-
ties has long been apparent in the United States and Europe, particularly the United King-
dom, opposition to racial profiling began developing only in the 1980s and 1990s.  
In the United Kingdom and United States, black and Hispanic minorities have 
historically borne the brunt of disproportional law enforcement scrutiny. Elsewhere in 
Europe, discriminatory policing has also been known to occur, be it through frequent 
raids on Roma communities, disproportionate surveillance, stops and identity checks 
in immigrant neighborhoods, or a greater incidence of reported acts of police violence 
against ethnic minority members. So, too, in Russia has discriminatory police targeting 
of ethnic and racial minorities been widely acknowledged. Regardless of where it is prac-
ticed, ethnic and racial profiling by the police is premised at least in part on unfounded 
stereotypes that specific ethnic and racial minorities are more likely to perpetrate crimes 
than others.
The United Kingdom experienced decades of tensions between its police forces 
and the black African-Caribbean community, including race riots, notably in Brixton, 
in the 1980s. One of the earliest studies commissioned by the U.K. Home Office in 
1983 concluded that “blacks, particularly young black males, were much more likely 
to be stopped and searched by the police than whites” despite the fact that subsequent 
prosecution rates for the two races were the same.11
In the late 1990s, the botched police investigation of a racist murder of a black 
teenager, Stephen Lawrence, and a study by the London Metropolitan Police confirm-
ing a low arrest rate through racially disproportionate stop-and-search practices,12 
finally prompted reform.13 Through the Race Relations (Amendment) Act of 2000, the 
United Kingdom has extended the prohibition on racial discrimination to the perfor-
mance of public functions by public authorities, including the police and government 
departments.14 
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When studies published in the United States in the 1990s revealed the pervasive-
ness of discriminatory targeting of minorities in the context of the “war on drugs,” oppo-
sition to  racial and ethnic profiling crystallized. Groundbreaking research quantified 
alarming evidence of racial profiling by the police in stopping suspect vehicles driving 
on an interstate highway. For example, between January 1995 and September 1996, 
70% of 823 citizens detained for drug searches on a particular highway were African 
American.15
In a landmark case, State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996), a 
New Jersey court relied on statistical evidence to determine that the New Jersey State 
Police were engaging in unlawful racial profiling. The case involved 17 African-Ameri-
can defendants who were on trial for transporting illegal drugs after they had been 
arrested while driving on an interstate highway between Washington, D.C. and New 
York City.  The defendants argued that the evidence against them was illegal because the 
police unlawfully arrested them based on discriminatory enforcement of traffic laws in 
violation of the state constitution. As part of their legal defense, social psychologist Dr. 
John Lamberth conducted a statistical analysis of traffic stops on the highway during the 
month of June 1993 through the novel methodology of benchmarking and observational 
monitoring. His study revealed that although only 13.5% of all drivers on the highway 
during the randomly-selected times were African American, 37.4% of all stops involved 
racial minorities.16 The differential yielded a statistically significant disparity: blacks 
were 4.85 times more likely to be stopped than whites.17 Presented with this strong 
statistical evidence, the court concluded that the New Jersey State Police were targeting 
blacks, an intentional and purposeful form of discrimination against African-Americans 
that violated the equal protection clause of the New Jersey State Constitution.18 The court 
declared the evidence seized from these defendants as a result of the illegal stops and 
searches inadmissible. State v. Soto was a far-reaching legal precedent, signaling that 
racial profiling is not only an odious practice, it is also illegal.   
The methodology of the benchmark survey and observational analysis has since 
been widely accepted as a reliable tool for measuring the prevalence of ethnic profiling 
in the United States.19 Furthermore, the methodology of the observational benchmark 
has been applied in several studies measuring ethnic profiling of pedestrians and driv-
ers in the United Kingdom.20
Separate studies conducted in the United States in the late 1990s revealed further 
evidence of the prevalence of discrimination in police stop practices. A study of the New 
York City police force practices in the context of its anti-gun campaign revealed alarm-
ing evidence of the pervasiveness of racial profiling: about 51% of all persons stopped 
between 1998 and 1999 were black, while 33% were Hispanic.21 Yet a smaller percentage 
of blacks and Hispanics who were stopped were ultimately arrested than were whites 
who were stopped.22  
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A Recent Shift in Practice and Public Opinion
This statistical proof of the high rate of ethnic profiling resulted in widespread pub-
lic condemnation of this practice among the American public. Indeed by late 1999, 
an overwhelming 80% of all Americans believed that racial profiling is “harmful and 
must be stopped.”23 To collect data to address racial profiling, more and more police 
departments around the United States began to record statistics on stop practices that 
documented race.24 Furthermore, politicians across the political spectrum condemned 
racial profiling and vowed to support measures to end it. So committed were politicians 
to end racial profiling, the United States Congress considered the passage of the End 
Racial Profiling Act of 2001, which would have explicitly prohibited racial profiling by 
federal law enforcement and outlined concrete policies the federal government would 
undertake to end the practice.  
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 prompted an immediate shift in public 
opinion toward racial and ethnic profiling. Whereas 80% of Americans condemned 
racial profiling in 1999, 58% of those polled shortly after September 11, 2001 agreed 
that U.S. airlines should subject Arabs, including those who are U.S. citizens, to special, 
intensive security checks before boarding airplanes in the United States.25 A clear major-
ity of Americans have come to support ethnic, racial, and religious profiling against 
Arabs, South Asians, and Muslims in the context of the so-called war on terror.
Counter-terrorism measures in the United Kingdom have resulted in increased 
ethnic profiling. Section 44 of the Terrorism Act of 2000 permits police officers to use 
stop-and-search powers without reasonable suspicion in authorized areas of high risk of 
terrorism, with the entire City of London being designated as one such area. Between 
2001 and 2003, the number of people targeted under this provision rose from 8,550 
to 21,577 throughout the United Kingdom, with the City of London and Metropolitan 
Police Services accounting for four-fifths of these stops. These stops disproportionately 
targeted blacks and Asians, who were four to five times more likely to be stopped than 
whites.26 Notably, only 1.18% of these stops resulted in arrests.
The above experience illustrates how views of ethnic and racial profiling—what 
it is and what is permissible—have changed in the United States and Europe since 
September 11, 2001. Whereas ethnic profiling was originally understood to concern the 
stopping of African or Latino citizens in the United States and Roma, immigrants, or 
persons of African origins in Europe, “[n]ow [it] is more likely to mean security checks 
or . . .  investigations that target Muslim men from the Middle Eastern countries, in 
order to try to catch terrorists. And now lots of people are for it.”27 Ethnic and racial 
profiling, however, continues to occur as a practice in both criminal law enforcement 
and counter-terrorism. Studies must continue to monitor its prevalence and effects in 
these two distinct spheres and combat it accordingly. 
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Ethnic Profiling is Inefficient Law Enforcement
Proponents of ethnic profiling claim erroneously that ethnic profiling is an efficient 
law enforcement tool. Those in favor of ethnic profiling in counter-terrorism measures 
argue, for example, that we know from September 11, 2001 that terrorist attacks are 
perpetrated by Arab men from the Middle East; we should therefore focus our resources 
on stopping, searching, and investigating men from this limited pool of individuals. 
Yet evidence from both criminal law enforcement and counter-terrorist efforts 
reveal the shortcomings of this argument and suggest that in fact, ethnic profiling results 
in inefficient law enforcement. For example, the U.S. federal government has embarked 
on three law enforcement campaigns purportedly as counter-terrorism pursuits after 
September 11, 2001, explicitly targeting Arab, Muslim, and South Asian men.28 One 
commentator has noted the resounding failure of this discriminatory effort as follows:
  Of the 80,000 Arabs and Muslim foreign nationals who were required to register after Sep-
tember 11, the 8,000 called in for FBI interviews, and more than 5,000 locked up in preven-
tive detention, not one stands convicted of a terrorist crime today. In what has surely been the 
most aggressive national campaign of ethnic profiling since World War II, the government’s 
record is 0 for 93,000.29
One fundamental difficulty with ethnic profiling can be referred to as a “category 
problem. Generalizations involve matching a category of people to a behavior or trait
. . .  [b]ut, for that process to work, you have to be able both to define and to identify 
the category you are generalizing about.”30 In the counter-terrorism scenario, it is more 
difficult than assumed to determine what an “Islamic terrorist” looks like. Yet the more 
law enforcement targets people based on ethnic profiling, the easier it is for terrorists 
to avoid detection by recruiting perpetrators from outside that ethnic profile. The more 
predictable law enforcement profiling becomes, the easier it is for perpetrators to adapt 
to circumvent the profile. Such was the case of the perpetrators of the London bombings 
in July 2005 who hailed originally from Pakistan, Jamaica, and East Africa rather than 
a traditional Arab or Middle Eastern country. Raymond Kelly, now police commissioner 
in New York City, sums up the inefficiency of profiling as follows:
  You think that terrorists aren’t aware of how easy it is to be characterized by ethnicity? . . . 
Look at the 9/11 hijackers. They came here. They shaved. They went to topless bars. They 
wanted to blend in. They wanted to look like they were part of the American dream. These 
are not dumb people. Could a terrorist dress up as a Hasidic Jew and walk into the subway, 
and not be profiled? Yes. I think profiling is just nuts.31
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Ethnic profiling assumes a consistent association, if not a causal relationship, 
between race and ethnicity and criminal activity. But focusing law enforcement efforts 
on race alone is both under- and over-inclusive. Ethnic profiling is under-inclusive in 
that it fails to detect many criminals who do not fit the ethnic profile. Ethnic profiling 
is over-inclusive in that it subjects a large number of innocent persons to the burden 
and, at times, humiliation or worse, of being stopped and/or searched, at least in part, 
because of their ethnic origin. Thus, the studies mentioned above revealed low hit rates 
in uncovering criminal activity when law enforcement engaged in racial profiling as 
part of the drug interdiction campaign on U.S. highways, the anti-gun campaign in New 
York, or the post 9/11 counter-terrorism campaign in the United States. 
Stereotypes about ethnic minority involvement in criminal activity run deep but are 
often wrong. Unfortunately, statistical links between ethnic groups and crimes become 
a “self-fulfilling prophecy.”32 The fact that certain ethnic groups are over-represented in 
arrest figures for certain offenses can be explained by the fact that official statistics are 
the product of criminal justice practices. One study from the United Kingdom demon-
strates that the over-representation in the British criminal justice system of people of 
African and Caribbean origin does not accurately reflect a general propensity for crime 
among that population.33
To be sure, it is significantly more efficient to identify stable indicators, or objec-
tive profiles, that do not feature race. A good illustration that profiling based on behav-
ioral patterns rather than race or ethnicity is in fact more efficient is the experience of 
the United States Customs service in the late 1990s. This service searches travelers for 
contraband at U.S. borders. Under the stewardship of then-Commissioner Raymond 
Kelly, the service overhauled the criteria for stopping suspects at the border. Rather 
than rely on ethnicity, the service strengthened supervision of searches and adopted the 
following six broad behavioral criteria to select suspects to stop and search: (1) Is there 
something suspicious about their physical appearance? (2) Are they nervous? (3) Is there 
specific intelligence targeting the person? (4) Does the drug-sniffing dog raise an alarm? 
(5) Is there something amiss in their paperwork or explanations? (6) Has contraband 
been found that implicates the person?  
Prior to the reforms, the Customs service conducted 10,733 personal searches in 
the first quarter of 1999, which resulted in 376 drug seizures, a hit rate of 3.5%. After 
the new behavioral criteria had been adopted, 2,814 personal searches were conducted in 
the first quarter of 2000, resulting in 306 seizures. This represented a dramatic increase 
in the hit rate to nearly 11%.34 These figures demonstrate that stable behavioral criteria 
rather than race or ethnicity are more effective predictors of illegal behavior. Other stud-
ies have unearthed low hit rates from crime detention when law enforcement engages 
in ethnic profiling.35
E T H N I C  P R O F I L I N G  I N  T H E  M O S C O W  M E T R O    25
Racial and ethnic profiling is also ineffective in that it alienates communities from 
cooperating with law enforcement and contributing to law enforcement’s gathering of 
good intelligence.36 Baseless targeting of innocent members of a racial and ethnic com-
munity breeds fear and suspicion of the police, as a racial profiling in the war on drugs 
and of the more recent ethnic profiling of counter-terrorist measures has shown.37 As 
a result, constructive partnerships between communities and the police to foster effec-
tive intelligence gathering have been hampered. By undermining relations between law 
enforcement and law-abiding members of minority communities, ethnic profiling has 
the perverse effect of ultimately decreasing public safety for all.  
The ineffectiveness of racial and ethnic profiling as a law enforcement tool should 
not overshadow the detrimental human cost that it inflicts on individuals and racial and 
ethnic minority communities. Being stopped by the police primarily because of ethnic-
ity can amount to discrimination and it has serious consequences for the individuals 
targeted.  At the very least, unjustified stops and searches can be stressful and humiliat-
ing experiences. Those who are stopped may be subject to threats or police abuse. More 
extreme consequences include the type of severe human rights violations suffered by 
innocent Arab and Muslim men rounded up, detained, and held incommunicado in the 
wake of September 11, 2001. By officially endorsing negative stereotypes and generaliza-
tions of minorities, ethnic profiling perpetuates further discrimination.
The Illegality of Ethnic Profiling under 
International Law
Ethnic profiling is unlawful under international law. A number of core international 
human rights norms prohibiting racial and ethnic discrimination are relevant to eth-
nic profiling.38 For example, the United Nations Race Convention prohibits racial dis-
crimination with respect to “freedom of movement,”39 and the “right to equal treatment 
before the tribunals and all other organs administering justice.”40 The general equality 
provision of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)41 and other 
specific guarantees therein prohibit racial discrimination in relation to the “the right 
to liberty and security of the person,” outlaw “arbitrary arrest or detention,” and bar 
deprivation of liberty “except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure 
as are established by law.”42 The Program of Action of the UN World Conference Against 
Racism in 2000 endorsed these universal standards when it urged “States to design, 
implement, and enforce effective measures to eliminate the phenomenon popularly 
known as ‘racial profiling.’”43 
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Parallel prohibitions on discrimination and guarantees for the full and equal 
enjoyment of rights in the administration of justice are enshrined in the European 
Convention on Human Rights.44 The European Court of Human Rights has expounded 
on these provisions in ways that confirm the illegality of ethnic profiling.45 Building on 
this jurisprudence, the Council of Europe’s Commission against Racism and Intolerance 
(ECRI) has specifically addressed ethnic profiling in stops and identity checks, even in 
the context of counter-terrorism measures. ECRI’s general policy recommendation No. 9 
(2004) on Combating Racism while Fighting Terrorism urges governments to “pay 
particular attention to . . . ensuring that no discrimination ensues from legislation and 
regulations—or their implementation” in, among other fields, “checks carried out by law 
enforcement officials within the countries and by border control personnel.”46
International and regional guidelines on police conduct also make clear that racial 
and ethnic discrimination is inconsistent with good practice and the duty to enforce the 
law.  The United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials47 provides that 
rights protected by the UN Race Convention, as well as other international instruments 
prohibiting racial and ethnic discrimination, are among those “human rights of all per-
sons” that law enforcement officials must “maintain and uphold.”48 The European Code 
of Police Ethics of the Council of Europe, adopted recently by the committee of Minis-
ters, expressly recommends that “[t]he police shall carry out their tasks in a fair manner, 
in particular, guided by the principles of impartiality and non-discrimination.”49
Ethnic and racial profiling is an illegal practice that occurs in many countries.50 
The advanced studies conducted in the United States and the United Kingdom of ethnic 
and racial profiling in both the criminal law enforcement and counter-terrorism realms 
prove that such profiling is inefficient and bad policing. The development of the concept 
of ethnic and racial profiling in the United States and Europe serves as the compara-
tive foundation for the Moscow Metro Monitoring Study, which sought to determine 
whether and to what degree ethnic profiling is perpetrated by the Moscow police.
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IV. The Moscow Metro Monitoring 
 Study: The Highest Ethnic
 Profiling Odds Ratio Ever
 Documented
The Study
The Moscow Metro Monitoring Study was the first analysis to apply the rigorous meth-
odology of benchmarking and observational monitoring to quantify ethnic profiling out-
side of the United States and United Kingdom. The purpose of the study was to test the 
hypothesis that ethnic minorities are disproportionately stopped by the Moscow police 
for identity and document checks. Modalities for the study were designed by a leading 
expert, John Lamberth, and the actual benchmarking, observational monitoring, and 
interviewing were conducted in Moscow from May through September 2005.
The study involved several elements. First, the sample environment in which to 
collect statistically reliable and unbiased data was selected. Second, objective monitors 
were trained. Third, monitors engaged in “benchmarking” in order to determine the 
characteristics of the general population under scrutiny. Fourth, monitors observed and 
recorded data concerning the police stops they observed. Fifth, monitors interviewed a 
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sample group of 367 individuals who had been stopped by the police, to record qualita-
tive data concerning their experience of being stopped. The last three activities—bench-
marking, monitoring, and interviewing—occurred in overlapping phases.  
To obtain a statistically reliable sample size, the study aimed to record the eth-
nicities of at least 1,000 passengers at each Metro station monitored and to record data 
concerning at least 100 police stops at the same. In the end, the study recorded the 
ethnicities of 33,760 individuals, observed 1,523 police stops across 15 Moscow Metro sta-
tions, and conducted 367 interviews with selected individuals who had been stopped.
Sample Selection of the Metro Stations and Times for Monitoring
The Moscow Metro Monitoring Study quantified the stop practice of Moscow police at 
exits of Moscow Metro stations. Metro exits presented a stable environment in which 
monitors could consistently observe the actions of the Moscow police in an unobtru-
sive manner, thereby ensuring the accuracy of the study. The study monitored police 
behavior at the exits of 15 Moscow Metro stations. Stations were selected that had docu-
mented high ridership and stable police presence to justify monitoring.51 To measure a 
cross-section of Moscow Metro ridership, the study chose 15 stations divided into five 
functional categories: three stations at railway terminals, three at bus terminals, one at 
an open air market, four stations in the downtown district, and four stations serving 
residential neighborhoods.52   
Monitoring sessions were conducted at specific times to reflect peak ridership and 
passenger traffic at the different train stations. As such, downtown stations were moni-
tored from 9:00 to 13:00 to capture commuters arriving in the city; residential stations 
and bus stations were monitored from 15:00 to 20:00/21:00 to capture those leaving 
the city. Because activity at railway stations is constantly high all day long, these stations 
were monitored from 15:00 to 20:00 so the monitoring shifts were contiguous.       
Training Monitors 
The study’s designers hypothesized that law enforcement officials distinguish individu-
als based on their physical appearance. To mimic this behavior, the Moscow Metro 
Monitoring Study observed individuals and classified them into three distinct ethnic 
categories. It should be emphasized that the study defined these categories to mirror 
what it posited were the stereotypes employed by Moscow police in linking physical 
appearance to ethnicity and national origin.
The first category consisted of “Slavs,” namely those individuals with fair complex-
ion, such as ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians. The second category was 
comprised of “minorities,” encompassing the national minorities of the former Soviet 
Union, namely people hailing from the Caucasus and Central Asia. Individuals in this 
category are typically identified as having a darker complexion than individuals of Slav 
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appearance, with darker hair and some pronounced facial features. The third category 
was classified as “other.” This last group was intended to encompass all individuals who 
appear to come from outside the area of the former Soviet Union, including Africans, 
East Asians, Western Europeans, Americans and others not included in the first two 
categories. 
To guarantee the uniformity of the monitors’ classification of individuals into 
the three categories, an “interrater reliability test” was administered to each. Twenty 
three pictures of individuals representing a number of ethnicities seen in Moscow were 
flashed on a computer screen at four-second intervals. The monitor was required to 
classify the ethnicity of the person in each picture. After all of the monitors were tested, 
the “correct” answers were determined based on the consensus answers of the moni-
tors’ responses.
Benchmarking
The ethnic composition of a population available to be stopped by the police in a certain 
environment, such as at the exits of Moscow Metro stations, can differ from the ethnic 
composition of the total population as reported in a census. It is necessary therefore to 
measure the appropriate ethnic composition of the sample population under scrutiny 
to determine whether the police are disproportionately stopping members of a certain 
ethnic group in that context. Measuring this sample population demographic is called 
the “observational benchmark.”53
To identify the benchmark against which to measure ethnic profiling, observers 
monitor specific locations at randomly selected days and times to generalize the popula-
tion at those locations. The ethnic composition of the population at these locations is 
then compared to the ethnicity of the individuals who are stopped by the police at these 
locations. To ensure the accuracy of the observations, the number of individuals in the 
benchmark should be as large as possible, preferably over 1,000.
Monitoring Stops and Document Checks
For the Moscow Metro Monitoring Study, observational benchmarking was conducted 
simultaneously with the monitoring and recording of data regarding police stops and 
document checks observed at the 15 Metro stations under analysis. Teams of three moni-
tors were deployed to each of the 15 Moscow Metro stations under study. Two of the 
monitors focused on benchmarking, with one monitor determining and recording the 
ethnicity of the exiting passengers while the other determined the gender and age of 
exiting passengers. The third monitor focused on and recorded data for individuals they 
observed being stopped by the police.
Benchmarking observation was conducted between May 21 and July 3, 2005  for 
seven of the 15 stations and between June 11 and June 27, 2005 for the eight others. 
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During this time, the ethnicities of 33,760 individuals were recorded across the 15 Metro 
stations under scrutiny. Because the monitors did not observe at least 100 police stops 
of individuals at the Metro stations to achieve the desired sample during this time, the 
monitoring of stops continued along with interviewing through September 2, 2005.  
Interviews
From June 29, 2005 through September 2, 2005, individuals who had been stopped by 
the police were interviewed by the study monitors to determine their perceptions of the 
encounter with the police. Respondents were asked a set series of questions, including 
whether they had been stopped by the police before and if so, how often it happened to 
them. They were also asked if their papers were currently in order, whether the police 
had confirmed the status of their papers during the stop, whether the police were cour-
teous to them, whether they paid a fine, and why they were let go.  
In the last three weeks of the study, monitors asked additional questions of those 
who reported that they had been stopped before, such as whether they had been taken 
to a police post during those prior stops. If they had been previously taken to a police 
post, the monitors asked whether their papers were in order at that time and to describe 
the specific details of the last time they were taken to the police post. 
The Results 
Metro Ridership
The Moscow Metro Monitoring Study observed and classified 33,760 individuals to 
benchmark ethnicity and 32,686 individuals to benchmark age/gender at the 15 sta-
tions.  The proper categorization of only 131 individuals for ethnicity and 138 for gen-
der/age (0.4% for both categories) was unknown. The benchmarking concluded that 
the ridership of the Moscow Metro is heavily Slav, with Slav riders constituting 95.4% 
of all riders at the 15 stations.54  
It is important to note that the benchmarking and observational monitoring 
determined that the third category under analysis, namely “other,” was very small. Of 
the 33,891 individuals categorized during benchmarking, only 170 were identified as 
“other.”  Furthermore, only 60 stops of the 1,523 total observed were of “others.” In 
response, the study collapsed the third category of “others” into the second category of 
“minorities.”  The results of the study, therefore, distinguish two categories, namely 
“Slavs” and “non-Slavs.”
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A Clear Pattern of Police Stops
The study monitors also recorded observational data regarding police practices. For 
example, through the monitors’ observation, the study concluded that the police keep 
no records of the individuals they have stopped. Rather, the clear pattern emerged that 
police stop a Metro rider, look at his or her identity papers, and then release the subject 
of scrutiny without recording any information. Because the stops are done quickly with 
no record made by the police officer, the police stop data recorded in the Moscow Metro 
Monitoring Study is unique.  
The study monitors also observed police escorting a small number of individuals 
they had stopped to the police posts. Some of these police posts were located within the 
Moscow Metro stations while others were located outside of the Metro but in the vicinity 
of the Metro station exits.  
Police Stops and Ethnicity
The statistic called the “odds ratio”55 is the best way to understand whether ethnic pro-
filing is occurring or not. This ratio quantifies whether it is more likely than not that 
members of a particular ethnic group are stopped by the police compared to others. If 
no ethnic profiling occurs, the odds ratio would be 1.0 indicating that non-Slavs are no 
more likely to be stopped than Slavs.
While odds ratios between 1.0 and 1.5 are considered benign, those between 
1.5 and 2.0 indicate that a review of the stop practice should be conducted to determine 
if bias exists. Ratios above 2.0 indicate there is potential targeting of minorities for 
police stops. 
The odds ratio results from the Moscow Metro Monitoring Study are presented 
for the 15 stations monitored in Table 1. 
The odds ratios listed in Table 1 represent the most extreme and egregious ethnic 
profiling ever documented through a statistical survey of the practice. Of the prior stud-
ies in the United States that applied the same benchmarking and observational monitor-
ing methodology, the most egregious case of racial profiling encountered was the 4.85 
odds ratio revealed of highway stops by the New Jersey State Police, who admitted that 
they were targeting black motorists. 
On average, non-Slavs constituted 4.6% of the total population of the Moscow 
Metro at the 15 stations monitored but constituted 50.9% of the total population stopped 
by the police. The average odds ratio for all of the 15 Metro stations surveyed was 21.8. 
This is 4.4 times as large as the 4.85 odds ratio, which was previously the highest ethnic 
profiling odds ratio ever recorded. This odds ratio is so high that a credible explanation 
for the disparity not based on ethnicity would be difficult to find.
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TABLE 1.  
Benchmarks Numbers, Percent of Non-Slavs, Non-Slav Stops and 
Odds Ratios for Minorities at 15 Metro Stations Surveyed
Station Bench-mark 
N
Benchmark 
% Non-Slavs
Stops N Stops % 
Non-Slavs
Difference
%
Odds Ratio
Belorusskaya 925 6.0 108 19.4 13.4  3.8
Komsomolskaya 6,828 7.6 117 45.3 37.7 10.1
Savelovskaya 1625 3.5 103 56.3 52.8 35.8
Cherkizoskaya 500 7.4 161 80.1 72.7 51.4
VDNH 2,813 4.4 65 63.1 58.7 36.8
Schelkovskaya 3,132 4.7 194 49.0 44.3 19.3
Rechnoi vokzal 3,454 3.6 105 57.1 53.5 35.2
Arbatskaya 1,076 4.4 25 52.0 47.6 23.6
Okhotnyi riad 3,213 3.3 91 29.7 26.4 12.3
Kitai-gorod 1,659 3.1 72 36.1 33.0 17.7
Proletarskaya 1,369 2.7 65 36.9 34.2 21.0
Chertanovskaya 1,130 3.0 111 53.2 50.2 36.9
Tushinskaya 2,500 4.1  96 54.2 50.1 27.5
Medvedkovo 1,698 2.8 80 71.3 68.5 84.9
Tioplyi Stan 1,838 3.9 130 46.2 42.3 21.2
Total 33,760 1,523
Police Stops and Gender/Age
There were slightly more females (51.6%) observed at the stations studied than there 
were males (48.4%). Almost 40% of all riders benchmarked were classified as young 
(30 and below) but the largest group was middle aged people (48.4%) with only 12.2% 
being classified as old (60 and above). The ages of those stopped by police, however, 
were quite different from the population: for example, young males represented just 
19.4% of all riders but accounted for 43.3% of all stops (see Table 2). 
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TABLE 2.  
Percentages of the Population and Those Stopped by the Police 
at 15 Metro Stations in Moscow, by Gender and Age.
Young 
Males
Middle 
Males
Old Males Young 
Females
Middle 
Females
Old 
Females
Total N
Population 19.4 23.0 6.0 19.9 25.4 6.2 32,686
Police Stops 43.3 29.5 4.4 15.0 7.1 0.7 1,502
Difference 23.4 6.5 –1.6 –4.9 –18.3 -5.5
Odds Ratio  3.2 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.1
As Table 2 demonstrates, the only group targeted by the police based on age and 
gender is that of young males.  
Interviews
Monitors conducted 367 interviews during the course of two months.56 Interviews were 
conducted at all 15 Metro stations monitored. Interestingly, the overwhelming propor-
tion of those interviewed (89.0%) said that the police were courteous to them.
Monitors asked the respondents whether this was the first time they had been 
stopped and how often they were stopped. Evidently, being stopped is common for 
riders of the Moscow Metro: 81.7% of the respondents indicated that they had been 
stopped before.  Non-Slavs (93%) were more likely than Slavs (72%) to have been 
stopped before. 
Monitors asked the interviewees two open-ended questions. The first of these 
asked what they were told when the police let them go. Of the respondents, 11.4% did 
not answer the question and 67.4% reported that the police said nothing. Only 0.7% 
said that the police took money and 2% said they were warned to get a registration. The 
second open-ended question asked what else happened to the interviewees when they 
were stopped by the police. The largest number of respondents (72%) who answered 
said “nothing.” The next largest percentage of respondents (20%) said that the police 
checked their identity papers.  Two respondents said that the police checked their papers 
on a computer. Five respondents were taken to the police room and eight said that they 
were searched.  Finally, only two said that they were fined.
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Rationale for Stops: The Hit Rate
The most important piece of information produced by observational monitoring of eth-
nic profiling is the “hit rate” associated with the police stops, or the rate at which the 
police discover a breach of the law through their stops. To protect public safety, the 
police should be watching for suspicious behavior that would indicate criminal or ter-
rorist activity. The most common breach the Moscow Metro Monitoring Study observed, 
however, was the administrative violation of invalid residence papers.  
The study calculated the hit rate from information collected through the interviews 
with individuals who had been stopped by the police.  Monitors asked the interviewees 
whether their papers were in order. Of the 30357 interviews carried out, nine (3%) of the 
respondents indicated that their papers were not in order. This low rate indicates that the 
police are not getting many “hits,” and that those they are uncovering represent minor 
administrative violations. As such, the police seem to be wasting the vast majority of the 
time they spend on stopping individuals. It may also indicate that they are employing 
the wrong criteria in deciding whom to stop. Five of the nine individuals whose papers 
were not in order were Slavs while four were non-Slavs.  
Further evidence on hit rates was gained from the 24 individuals interviewed who 
said that on previous occasions they had been detained for some time at police posts. 
Of these, 21 indicated that their papers were in order on that occasion; three indicated 
that they were not. Thus, even with this selected small sample of individuals whose 
papers had been checked previously and had been taken to police posts, only 12.5% 
had a problem with their papers. Because the sample size of 24 individuals is so small 
and they are not randomly selected it is highly probable that the 3% figure is the more 
reliable hit rate indicator. 
It is not possible to arbitrarily designate an acceptable generic hit rate because the 
hit rate must be evaluated in the context of what the searches uncover or if the searches 
are responsible for reducing serious crime. While there is no agreed upon hit rate that 
is considered desirable by police, some illustrations of how other agencies who stop 
pedestrians have dealt with the issue are instructive.  
The experience from the United States Department of Customs explained in Sec-
tion III is a good example of how reducing ethnic profiling improves the efficiency of 
the police. In the study of the U.S. Department of Customs practices from 1998, at a 
time when disproportionate searches were conducted on minorities, the hit rate uncov-
ering illegal contraband was only 3%. When the Customs director changed the criteria 
for searching air travelers to rely less on ethnicity and more on objective criteria, the hit 
rate increased from 3.8% to 14.9%.  
With a 3% hit rate, the Moscow police are both failing to uncover illegal activity 
and potentially alienating 97 out of every 100 individuals stopped. While most stops 
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are short—less than a minute—there is still a measure of inconvenience. To determine 
individuals’ perceptions of the inconvenience, the last question asked by monitors dur-
ing interviews was an open-ended question inquiring how the respondents “felt about 
the stop.” Of the 367 interviewed, 33 individuals responded “nothing.” Of the 286 who 
answered the question, 103 answered with a negative comment about their experience. 
The negative answers ranged from those who said it was unpleasant to increasing 
expressions of negativity or disdain for the police.
A sample of the negative comments includes the following, from least to most 
pejorative:  (1) “It’s a pain in the neck;” (2) “I am fed up;” (3) “I am angry;” (4) “They 
stop girls because they have nothing to do;” (5) “It’s no good;” (6) “It’s nasty;” (7) “Shock, 
I am stricken;” (8) “This country is wide-open, human rights are violated;” (9) “Punks 
they are, they thrive on us;” (10) “I hate cops;” (11) “It is a clownery, look, here he stays, 
trainee, look, he goes away, such a snotter, he is new to work, but already wants money;” 
(12) “They are assholes.” 
Clearly the police pay a price for these stops, both in the failure to detect serious 
illegal activity and in damaged relations with the public. It seems they might wish to 
evaluate whether the pay off, namely uncovering nine people with papers that are not 
in order, is worth their maintaining this practice.
Rationale for Stops: Police Corruption
Another possible rationale for this practice is that the police are using stops as a 
means to extract bribes from the population. This question was not one of the articu-
lated goals of the Moscow Metro Monitoring Study, but some of the interview data 
speaks to the issue.
Those interviewed were asked if they had been asked to pay a fine during the stop. 
Only 7.1% (18) of those who answered the question indicated a “yes” answer. Monitors 
also asked the respondents if they had voluntarily offered the police money; only 1.5% 
(4) of the respondents said that they had. Three of these four respondents were among 
the 18 respondents that indicated that the police had asked them to pay a fine. Thus, 
only 19 (7.5%) of the people who answered those questions indicated that they had been 
asked or offered to pay money.   
These two questions, however, elicited the most refusals to answer of any in the 
interview. To the first question about whether they were asked to pay a fine, 51 (16.7%) 
did not answer. Slightly fewer (46) did not answer the next question about whether they 
gave the police money. It is understandable that those who bribe police would not want 
to answer these questions.  
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The interviews of the 24 respondents who had previously been taken to police 
posts shed some light on this issue. Only three of these 24 respondents reported in their 
interview that their papers were not in order.  
These three individuals, when asked to describe the specific details of the last time 
they were taken to the police post said: (1) “I was arguing with them for 20 minutes. 
They wanted money. But I said that I don’t have the money;” (2) “They held me for three 
days, then I paid;” (3) “You sit there for three hours, then they let you go.” 
Of the other 21 who had been taken previously to police posts, six indicated that 
nothing happened or that they did not remember. The remaining 15 said that either they 
were asked for money or that they thought the police wanted money. Even presuming 
that many of those taken to the police post are asked for money, that would account for 
only 5% of those stopped.
The Moscow Metro Monitoring Study monitors observed over 1,500 stops. At 
least 350 of those stops were monitored from the moment the monitor saw the person 
stopped until she was released so that the person stopped could be interviewed. Of all of 
the stops observed, the monitors saw only two stops at which money changed hands.  
In conclusion, the Moscow Metro Monitoring Study reveals unambiguous proof 
of ethnic profiling: although non-Slavs make up only 4.6% of the riders on the Moscow 
Metro system, they account for 50.9% of persons stopped by the Moscow police at the 
exits of the Metro stations. The odds ratio indicating that non-Slavs are 21.8 times more 
likely than Slavs to be stopped by the police is remarkably four times as high as the 
highest evidence previously gathered from studies of ethnic profiling. The proof that 
ethnic profiling is occurring on a massive scale in the Moscow Metro is clear, as is the 
pointlessness of the exercise. With a hit rate uncovering administrative document viola-
tions in only 3% of the stops, no law-enforcement rationale for the continuance of this 
practice can be put forward. As the study shows that non-Slavs are treated differently 
from Slavs without any objective justification for this phenomenon, the Moscow Metro 
Monitoring Study has uncovered an unambiguous case of discrimination.
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V. A System Ripe for 
 Discrimination and Abuse: 
 The Law and Practice 
 of Police Stops and Document 
 Checks
The Moscow Metro Monitoring Study’s finding that the Moscow police are engaging 
in ethnic profiling of non-Slavs in its stop practice at exits of the Moscow Metro leaves 
open the question of why this practice is occurring. Why aren’t police held accountable 
for their time, which is spent fruitlessly stopping individuals without detecting any 
crime? This section surveys the law governing residence registration requirements, the 
structure of the police forces in Russia, and police powers to conduct stops to investigate 
crimes, revealing a permissive legal framework with no oversight—one that provides 
police officers great discretion in conducting stops and document checks.
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The Law on Registration and Identity Documentation
The Origins of the Soviet Passport System
The Soviet Union formed a vast territorial expanse encompassing a rich diversity of 
ethnicities and cultures of the former Tsarist empire, including distinct nationalities of 
the Caucasus and Central Asia. Soviet nationalities policy, however, embodied a mixed 
message, at times celebrating minority nationalities and cultures as part of the diverse 
heritage of the Soviet empire, while at others discouraging ethnic nationalism and even 
repressing minority nationalist impulses through force and displacement.58 From the 
early years of the Soviet Union, ethnicities and nationalities intermingled throughout 
Soviet territory.59  
Movement of peoples in the U.S.S.R. became tightly controlled through the insti-
tution of the mandatory internal passport, or propiska, system in 1932, implemented to 
prevent peasants from migrating to the cities.60 Under this system, individuals were 
required to request permission from the local authorities to register their permanent 
residence in a particular locality. Once permission was granted, the authorities issued 
a propiska, which was a stamp placed in internal passports. It was a difficult, bureau-
cratic procedure to secure formal permission to change one’s permanent residence or 
propiska.
In addition to the propiska, the internal passports of the U.S.S.R. contained per-
sonal information about each individual, including the mandatory designation of one’s 
ethnic nationality.61
The Current Regime
The propiska system requiring permission-based registration became illegal in the new 
Russian Federation.62 Article 27 of the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation 
guarantees the right to freedom of movement. Furthermore, mandatory classification 
of individuals by their nationality became unconstitutional as well, as Article 26 of the 
Constitution declares that “[e]veryone shall have the right to determine and indicate his 
nationality. No one may be forced to determine and indicate his nationality.”
The Law on Freedom of Movement,63 passed in 1993, transformed the principle of 
registration from an institution under which individuals were required to seek permis-
sion from the government to register residence to one of notification of residence. This 
law never mentions the term propiska. Most importantly, it explicitly stipulates that an 
individual’s enjoyment of rights does not depend on registration.64 Although the prop-
iska system has been outlawed, Russian citizens continue to use internal passports as 
a form of identity document.
Regulations require Russian citizens to notify the government of their permanent 
residence within seven days of establishing or changing it.65 Russian citizens who stay 
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for more than 90 days in living quarters that are not their permanent residence must 
notify the government of the place of their temporary stay.66 Foreigners must register 
with the authorities within three business days of their arrival into the Russian Federa-
tion and within three days from changing place of stay within Russia.67
Nevertheless, the law continues to require that Russian citizens and foreigners 
maintain valid current registration, and failure to do so is a violation of the Code of 
Administrative Offenses. Russian citizens68 and foreigners69 alike are subject to fines for 
infractions of these provisions. Furthermore, a Presidential Decree of 1997 established 
the requirement that every Russian citizen possess a valid main identity document.70 
This decree, however, is silent as to any requirement to carry the main identity docu-
ment at all times.
The procedures for registration as set forth in the Law of Freedom of Movement 
are straightforward: an individual must produce a form of identification and submit a 
letter of request and documentation that proves his or her right to an accommodation 
(ownership certificate, lease contract, inheritance certificate, court order, or a letter of 
the person providing the applicant with the accommodation).71  
In practice, however, some of the regional administrative districts called “Subjects” 
of the Russian Federation72 continued to rely on the propiska system, requiring individu-
als to request permission to register for permanent residency. Some localities perpetu-
ated this registration system in a discriminatory manner against ethnic minorities and 
to restrict migration into their territories, while others required individuals to produce 
extensive documentation in excess of that designated under the law.73 Abolishing the 
practice of the propiska system was further complicated by two factors, namely, the 
continuing valid usage of former Soviet internal passports, which explicitly revealed an 
individual’s nationality and contained existing propiskas,74 and the practice of interpret-
ing the Soviet Housing Code of 1983.75
Further, in clear violation of the Law on Freedom of Movement’s guarantees, local 
authorities continue to require proof of permanent registration before providing indi-
viduals with access to state services such as free education for children, medical care, 
registration of vehicles, and passports. While many individuals within Russia have out-
dated propiskas that do not accurately reflect their residence, some individuals never 
obtained a propiska. Individuals without proof of registration can be barred from obtain-
ing passports or going to court in any jurisdiction in Russia.76  
The Russian Constitutional Court ruled in 1998 that the Moscow authorities were 
unlawfully requiring additional documentation for individuals to properly register.77 
On other occasions it has ruled that the propiska system’s permission requirement was 
unconstitutional because it breached of the right to freedom of movement, sojourn, and 
residency. Despite these clear rulings, there were reports in 2003 that about ten Subjects 
of the Russian Federation continued to require that individuals seek residence permis-
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sion under the old propiska rules and that many other Subjects continued to link access 
to public services and enjoyment of basic rights with proof of permanent residence.78
Moscow has long been recognized as a “state within a state,”79 and the city is 
among the Subjects that continue to implement old rules of the propiska system in open 
defiance of the Constitutional Court.80 By continuing to follow the strict registration 
rules of the propiska system, Moscow has successfully limited the number of refugees 
and displaced persons settling within the city compared to some other regions and cities 
that have absorbed a greater share of this population.81
The propiska system and the current registration regime set the backdrop for the 
widespread and systematic practice of document checks. As the next section will show, 
the requirement of maintaining valid registration is compounded by Russian law, which 
grants police officers great discretion and authority to stop individuals whom they judge 
to be suspicious.
Police Stops and Document Checks: Law and Practice
Police Structure
Article 72 of the 1993 Russian Constitution establishes joint jurisdiction between 
the federal Russian government and the governments of the Subjects of the Russian 
Federation over law enforcement, law and order, public security, and the border zone 
regime, among other matters. The federal Ministry of the Interior comprises depart-
ments organized in a hierarchical structure that oversee the various police forces.82 The 
federal Ministry of the Interior, in conjunction with the governments of the Russian 
Subjects, appoints the chiefs of the regional Police Administrations of Internal Affairs 
of the Subjects.83 The Police Administrations of the subjects in turn create smaller Dis-
trict Administrations of Internal Affairs. Police posts are located within the District 
Administrations.
The Ministry of the Interior has authority over the following police forces: inter-
nal armed forces, traffic police, transport police (air, railway, naval transport), criminal 
police, organized crime and terrorism prevention units, public security units (including 
district plenipotentiaries of the police and patrol police), and economic crimes units, 
among others.84  
The Principal Administration of Internal Affairs of the City of Moscow (Moscow 
GUVD) holds the primary authority over police in Moscow. The City of Moscow’s web-
site lists ten District Administrations (UVDs with local police posts) throughout the 
geographic scope of the city.85
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There exists a separate District Administration (UVD) for the Moscow Metro in 
addition to the ten District Administrations (UVDs) linked to geographical districts of 
Moscow City. Information pertaining to the Moscow Metro UVD police force is available 
from the public information website of the Moscow Metro itself.86 This source explains 
the functions of the Moscow Metro UVD as follows:
  The UVD [Administration of Internal Affairs] on the Moscow Metro was created several days 
before the Moscow Metro opened on May 11, 1935. The Metro has always been a transport 
organization of high risk. This is why passengers are asked to be watchful and to report 
anything suspicious to the patrol policemen that are on patrol at each station. Taking into 
account that more that 9 million people use the Metro every day, offences often occur in 
the Metro. It’s mainly hooliganism, acts of vandalism, stealing, and robberies. UVD on the 
Moscow Metro is here to prosecute these offences. Moscow Metro is a very complex trans-
port institution of the city. There are many and various installations that help maintain the 
Metro. In these conditions it is a priority of the UVD on the Moscow Metro to maintain the 
security of the Metro and counteract terrorism. Officers of the UVD on the Moscow Metro 
not only patrol it, but also carry out hidden observations of the public order in the stations 
and on the trains. Part of the UVD is the largest patrol police service in the country—5,000 
servicemen. Nowhere in Russia is there such a large patrol police service. The Metro police 
also has its own investigation department, criminal investigations department, interrogation 
department, economic crimes department, and 24-hour duty stations. Last year [2004], its 
own department of mass events security was created. Just recently the UVD opened its own 
organized crime department. Several years ago, a special unit dealing with vagrancy and 
panhandling prevention was created in the Moscow Metro. There is also a special unit deal-
ing with minors, including stray children. In the North-East district of Moscow an up-to-date 
service dog-breeding center was opened. Several dozen dogs trained to detect explosives and 
drugs work in the Metro.87
Patrol forces of the Moscow Metro UVD deploy throughout the platforms, tunnels, 
and Metro stations subject to instructions by the higher-ranking officials in the force. 
However, the precise boundaries of the jurisdiction of the Moscow Metro UVD with 
relation to the jurisdiction of the 10 geographic District Administrations are unclear 
based on publicly-available information.88  
Police Powers to Conduct Stops and Identity Checks
Russian laws provide police great discretion and authority to conduct stops and docu-
ment checks. Article 11(2) of the Law on Police89 grants police the power to “check 
citizens’ identity papers if there are enough grounds to suspect that the subject has 
committed a crime or to believe that the subject is wanted or that there are grounds to 
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initiate administrative proceedings with regards to administrative violations concerning 
the subject.” The Law on Police regulates all police forces, including the UVDs of the 
City of Moscow.90  
A separate law, the Patrol Police Statute,91 provides additional guidelines for offi-
cers conducting patrols. Article 1(2) of the Patrol Police Statue establishes the duty of 
patrol police “to prevent and suppress crimes and administrative offenses.”92 Article 
100(3) grants patrol police the authority to “check citizens’ and officials’ identity papers 
if there are sufficient grounds to suspect that they have committed a crime or an admin-
istrative offense.”93 Article 107 grants patrol police broad authority to justify suspicion: 
“When on duty, patrols should pay particular attention to persons that are suspiciously 
watchful and anxious, that are unseasonably dressed, or dressed in clothes that do 
not fit their body type and height, and also to those who have bandages and injuries.” 
A search of jurisprudence emanating from Russian courts did not uncover any case law 
that expounded on the degree of suspicion required to justify a stop under the Law on 
Police or the Patrol Police Statute.
Further, Article 91 of the Criminal Procedure Code explains the circumstances 
under which police may detain individuals: “In case there is information that provides 
grounds to suspect that a subject is committing a crime, the subject may be detained 
if the subject tries to escape, or does not have a place of permanent residence, or their 
identity is not established. . . ”94 For criminal suspects, Article 5(11) of the Criminal 
Procedure Code allows interrogators, investigators, and prosecutors 48 hours to detain 
individuals for the purpose of questioning.95 By contrast, Article 27.5(1) of the Admin-
istrative Code allows police to subject violators of administrative laws to administrative 
detention lasting three hours. The code considers, however, that immigration violations 
are more serious and subjects can be held in administrative detention for immigration 
violations up to 48 hours.96
As explained above, Russian citizens are required to possess a valid main identity 
document and maintain valid current residence registration while foreigners are also 
required to maintain proper registration and legal immigration status. No law, however, 
explicitly mandates that Russian citizens and foreigners carry proof of identification or 
registration documentation at all times while circulating in public. Yet the law provides 
police officers and patrol police wide latitude to stop suspects, prompting a primary 
inquiry into a subject’s identity and personal information. Though police might justify 
stopping an individual for questioning based on one articulable suspicion, upon inter-
acting with that individual, the police have concomitant authority to investigate admin-
istrative offenses, including violations of Administrative Code Articles 18.18 and 19.15 
regarding valid registration. Although carrying an internal passport is not required, 
failing to do so may lead to lawful arrest by the police for purposes of establishing an 
individual’s identity.
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Although police may stop and check identification documents of individuals based 
on suspicion and thereby uncover administrative violations of faulty registration or doc-
ument status, the Administrative Code does not allow patrol police to levy fines on the 
spot. The Administrative Code currently sets the fine for violations of Article 19.15 (for 
Russian citizens) at 1,500–2,500 Rubles (approximately U.S.$50–$90) and for viola-
tions of Article 18.8 (for foreigners) at 1,000–1,500 Rubles (approximately U.S.$35–$50). 
Based on these amounts, levying fines for violations of these articles must follow the 
fine procedures set forth in Article 23.3 of the Administrative Code.
Levying fines on the spot for violations under Article 19.15 (Russian citizens with-
out valid registration) is beyond the authority of the police. However, writing up “pro-
tocols,” or reports, for violations of this article is within the authority of a wide range 
of police officials, including patrol police conducting community policing.97 According 
to Article 28.2 of the Administrative Code, authorities must first write up a protocol of 
the administrative offense, indicating the fine to be levied. Once a fine is imposed, an 
individual must pay that fine within 30 days via bank payment.98
The list of officials authorized to investigate violations by foreigners of Article 18.8 
of the Administrative Code is more limited. Police department chiefs (chiefs of UVDs) 
and their deputies, police chiefs and their deputies and judges are authorized to inves-
tigate violations of registration rules by foreigners,99 while only officials of the Federal 
Migration Service are allowed to issue protocols for such violations.100
To summarize the most relevant provisions pertinent to the Moscow Metro Moni-
toring Study of ethnic profiling, it should be clear that patrol police cannot fine either 
Russian citizens or foreigners for registration and immigration status violations, but 
they can stop anyone and detain them for up to 48 hours based solely on suspicion of 
commission of a crime or an immigration violation. This legal regime provides virtually 
unbridled discretion to the police to stop and check residence registration, creating an 
environment ripe for discrimination and abuse.

45
VI. Ethnic Profiling as 
 Official Policy in Moscow?
Against this backdrop lies the stark reality of pervasive racism and discrimination against 
ethnic minorities in Moscow, even though it is unconstitutional and illegal under Rus-
sian law.101 Ethnic profiling, harassment by police, and police abuse of ethnic minorities 
are well documented, and identity and document checks constitute a main pretext for 
this discriminatory policing.102 A city of increasing immigration under terrorist threat, 
Moscow faces legitimate security concerns. Yet as the Moscow Metro Monitoring Study 
proves, discriminatory stopping of non-Slavs for document checks is inefficient law 
enforcement. This section describes how ethnic profiling is fueled by an environment 
accepting of discrimination and xenophobia and a police force in crisis.
A City of Migration under Terrorist Threat
Moscow faces two legitimate concerns that merit heightened law enforcement scrutiny. 
The first is Moscow’s position as the target of a series of terrorist attacks since Russia 
reengaged in armed conflict in Chechnya in 1999. The second is the rise of migration. 
In light of the serious nature of daily threats to public safety, the Moscow Metro Moni-
toring Study’s results should cause great concern: law enforcement efforts are being 
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diverted from the effective investigation and prevention of terrorism and serious crime, 
and are instead focused on ineffective and discriminatory harassment of minorities for 
fruitless document checks.
In Moscow, the terrorist threat is real. On September 9 and 13 of 1999, bombs 
exploded in residential buildings in Moscow, killing more than 200 people, marking 
the beginning of a string of attacks apparently related to Russia’s ongoing conflict in 
Chechnya. Several terrorist attacks over the last years have struck dramatic targets in 
Moscow. For example, on August 25, 2004 two planes crashed after taking off from 
Domodedovo Moscow Airport as a result of detonated bombs.103 On October 23, 2002, 
42 Chechen terrorists seized a theater in Moscow and held over 700 people hostage for 
three days, ultimately resulting in the deaths of over one hundred people.104  
Closer to home for the vast Muscovite public, however, is the steady string of ter-
rorist attacks aimed either at the Moscow Metro or the vicinity of Metro station exits: 
On August 31, 2004 a suicide bomber detonated a bomb at Rizkskaya Metro station 
killing 10 people;105 on February 6, 2004 a bomb exploded 500 meters from the Avto-
zavodskaya Metro station platform within the train tunnel killing approximately 60 
people;106 on October 19, 2002 a car bomb exploded at a McDonald’s restaurant at the 
Yugo-Zapadnaya Metro station killing one person;107 on February 5, 2001 a bomb hidden 
under a bench in the platform of the Belorusskaya Metro station exploded wounding 
nine people;108 on August 8, 2000 a bomb exploded in the underground passenger 
tunnel connecting the Pushkinskaya and Tverskaya Metro stations killing 13 people and 
wounding 118 more.109
In addition to terrorist threats, Moscow is experiencing an influx of migration.110 
The population of Moscow has most recently been reported to be 10,382,754, with an 
additional 50,000–250,000 persons living in a dozen satellite cities who commute to 
Moscow daily.111 With the Russian population declining as a result of aging and low 
birth rates,112 Caucasians, Central Asians, and others are migrating to Russian factories, 
farms, and cities. In Moscow, such migrants are joined by Russian citizens from rural 
areas seeking employment.
Today, most immigration to Russia is illegal. As of February 2006, the Russian 
Federal Migration Service reported 650,000 legal labor migrants in Russia, but con-
firmed at least 4 million illegal immigrants in Russia and projected the number to be 
between 12 and 16 million.113 In 1997, the Federal Migration Service of Russia estimated 
only 500,000 illegal immigrants in Russia at that time.114 In light of Russia’s strict regis-
tration system, however, being “illegal” pertains to both Russian citizens and foreigners 
who fail to have either the appropriate residence registration or immigration and labor 
status.
E T H N I C  P R O F I L I N G  I N  T H E  M O S C O W  M E T R O    47
Moscow’s Response
The vibrant political and economic capital of the Russian Federation, Moscow retains its 
predominant ethnic Russian identity while attracting migrants from the former Soviet 
Republics and farther afield. The influx of migrants has been met in some quarters 
by xenophobia, racism, and protectionism. These attitudes can be seen in the Russian 
media.  An independent survey of media carried out from 2002-2005 documented the 
frequent and consistent portrayal of non-Slavs as criminals, terrorists, and threats to 
the Russian social fabric.115 Despite the labor shortage and the economic necessity of 
migration in Russia today, the media negatively depicts migrant workers as taking jobs 
from Russians.  More odiously, the media stereotypes minority ethnic nationalities as 
criminals and drug dealers.116 Roma, in particular, have been singled out for unsubstan-
tiated accusations of involvement in the drug trade.117
Moscow officials have endorsed xenophobic imagery that depicts an onslaught 
of immigrants taking over the city118 and propagates stereotypes of certain minorities 
as criminals. For example, a Moscow police official said in 2000: “Moscow gypsies are 
hereditary actors. They deal in gold and are in the drug business.”119  The same racist 
accusation has more recently been levied against African students in Russia.120 Public 
acceptance of such discriminatory rhetoric results in racially-motivated violence against 
non-Slavs perpetrated either by the police or by private individuals with the complicit 
oversight of the police.121
Migrant workers receive extremely low pay in Moscow122 and are vulnerable to 
a range of human rights abuses. Common human rights violations inflicted on this 
population include the refusal to pay wages, physical attacks, confiscation of passports, 
and verbal abuse and physical violence from law enforcement.123
Singling out of non-Slavs and foreigners for displacement and deportation has 
been a politically expedient tool that the Moscow government has exploited as an osten-
sible means of taking a tough stance on crime, although it has never been proven 
effective. In 1993, for example, Moscow authorities undertook a campaign of “street 
cleaning” in which they detained about 14,000 persons and deported 9,000, most of 
whom were dark-skinned individuals. The police claimed they were fighting crime and 
charged these thousands with failure to possess valid registration.124 A similar “clean up” 
campaign in Moscow targeting ethnic minorities and foreigners occurred in 1997 prior 
to the events to celebrate the 850th anniversary of the city’s founding.125
The tenor and purpose of ethnic profiling in Moscow shifted dramatically in 
1999 after the two residential building bombings. Although no one claimed respon-
sibility for the bombings, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov asserted in public that Islamic 
groups from Chechnya were responsible. In response, the mayor announced “Operation 
Whirlwind,” enlisting over 20,000 law enforcement officials to undertake a massive 
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anti-terror campaign of investigation and arrest. The mayor also issued an order that 
required all citizens who were temporarily staying in Moscow to reregister with the 
authorities.126 Identity checks became the prime pretext for police stops and arrests. 
This operation rounded up around 20,000 non-Muscovites, mostly ethnic minorities 
primarily from the Caucasus, and resulted in the expulsion of approximately 10,000 
individuals who reportedly did not possess valid residence registration papers.127 In an 
opinion poll conducted in September 1999, 90.3% of Moscow residents approved of a 
stricter registration regime, while only 7–9% did not.128
Discriminatory Application of Residence Registration 
and Document Checks
Since 1999, ethnic profiling and arbitrary enforcement of residence registration rules 
have remained the norm in Moscow. Waves of ethnically-targeted detentions peaked 
as the police responded to additional terrorist bombings. The pervasiveness of ethnic 
profiling prompts the question of whether it is a de facto result of prejudiced stereotypes 
engrained in individual police officers or an actual policy of the Moscow police. Policing 
strategy and internal regulations of the police are not available to the public.  
Press leaks support the position that ethnic profiling indeed is official policy. For 
example the Moscow newspaper Novaya Gazeta obtained in March 2001 a leaked copy 
of the minutes of a meeting under Lieutenant Colonel A. Podol’niy, chief of the criminal 
police of the Western District UVD of Moscow. These minutes reveal that the chief set 
target detection rates for officers of that UVD and reprimanded his subordinates for the 
following: “Instructions of the Chief of the criminal Police of the UVD of the Western 
Administrative District are not fulfilled: criminal cases . . . have not been opened for eth-
nic groups—they should be opened for persons of the following ethnic origins: Gypsies, 
Tajiks, Uzbeks, Azeris.”129 These internal instructions are proof that the police hierarchy 
is explicitly directing its officers to engage in ethnic profiling. How many other internal 
orders or instructions exist that endorse ethnic profiling as official policing strategy? 
Such police strategy is not transparent and it is very difficult for the public to know.
Local and international human rights organizations and intergovernmental bod-
ies have decried this practice, placing pressure on the governments, both of the city of 
Moscow and at the federal level, to remedy the situation. In 2003, the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee expressed its concern “about reports of racial profiling by 
law enforcement personnel.”130  In the same year, the United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination examined the crisis of racism and discrimination 
in Russia and concluded and recommended the following:
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13.  The Committee is concerned at reports of racially selective inspections and 
identity checks targeting members of specific minorities, including those from 
the Caucasus and Central Asia and Roma. The Committee recommends that the 
State party take immediate steps to stop the practice of arbitrary identity checks 
by law enforcement authorities. These steps should include the education and 
sensitization of police and law enforcement personnel to ensure that, in the per-
formance of their duties, they respect and protect the human rights of all persons 
without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin.
14.  The Committee is concerned about numerous reports that residence regis-
tration is used as a means of discriminating against certain ethnic groups, and 
the lack of residence registration is used to deny a number of political and social 
rights. While welcoming the fact that courts in the State party have declared 
such practices unconstitutional, the Committee recommends that the State party 
ensure that, in the implementation of the residence registration system, the stan-
dards laid down in federal law and supported by decisions of the Constitutional 
and Supreme Court are strictly applied.131
In response to widespread complaints of abuse by the Moscow police in conducting 
document checks, Moscow police chief Lieutenant-General V.V. Pronin issued an order 
on February 22, 2003 instructing all heads of units of the Moscow GUVD the following: 
  Let every officer know that it is prohibited for the police to use the kinds of treatment that humili-
ate citizen’s personal dignity, to check identity papers and registration in the city of Moscow without 
cause. According to the Law [On Police, Article 5], a police officer is obliged to protect and 
respect every person with no regard to their citizenship, place of residence, social, economic 
and professional status, racial or ethnic origin, gender, age, education, language, religious, 
political or other affiliations.132
This order is a ruse. Prohibiting police from stopping and checking identity papers 
“without cause” only repeats the broad discretion granted to all police officers to stop 
any individual based on suspicion of that individual’s commission of a crime or an 
administrative violation, such as improper residence registration. Yet Moscow’s most 
liberal newspaper Novaya Gazeta described Pronin’s order as a “way the police officers 
are fighting with the corrupt subordinates who are checking the identity papers.”133  
A Novaya Gazeta investigation into the impact of Pronin’s 2003 order revealed 
that much more than new instructions are required to reform police behavior. A series 
of three articles documented the ease with which police officers stopped individuals on 
the pretext of checking for administrative violations of registration papers. Interviews 
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with victims of these stops, and police officers’ families revealed the primary motivation 
of the police in conducting these stops: bribes. From the perspective of the victims of 
these stops, paying a bribe is the price to pay to avoid baseless arrest, detention, harass-
ment, and possibly worse.  
To illustrate, the following describes the experience of a Turkish worker named 
Bairam:
  After the decree of [Pronin in 2003] prohibiting th[e] lucrative pursuit, the only thing that changed 
for the Turk is that now he is stopped not at the exit from the Metro station, but closer to home 
. . . And what really deserves attention is that all the papers of the Turkish citizen are in thorough 
order. But alas, the practice is that policemen, depending on their mood find fault either with 
the visa, or residential permit (every day they claim that something in his papers is counter-
feit. . .) Sometimes Bairam didn’t have any money on him, and the officers would kindly give 
him a comfortable place for the night in the police cells. If by the morning no one brought 
them 1,500 Rubles (and that is the standard bail for the Turkish worker), they took his mobiles 
(during 6 months Bairam left 3 of his mobiles with the police), watches (one), new purse 
(one), and new leather gloves. . . . But as long as he will stay in this Moscow district, he has 
found only one solution—to keep it secret and silently share his wages with them.134
One junior sergeant of the patrol service described his opinion of Pronin’s order: 
“I am not really worried about it. It was clearly said that it is possible to check suspi-
cious individuals. Not only the papers, but their bags or anything for that matter. I could 
always get out of it.”135
The wife of a police officer, aware that her husband was supplementing his income 
with bribes, explained her initial fear at how Pronin’s order might cut her husband’s 
earnings:
  I saw it on TV that a law was adopted prohibiting the checks on the streets. I was scared, a 
little, but still scared. I thought he would have to look for a new job. I called Dennis’s mobile 
and hear that they were boozing hard. They were mourning the loss of incomes (she laughs). 
After they sobered up they went back out to the streets. Dennis has said that now only the 
passport and visa officers may check the papers. But how can you recognize them? A man in 
uniform is asking you for your ID papers, would you risk asking him what he was? Dennis 
has never met anyone who would do that. Yes, there is a decree, so what? It is written that it 
is possible to check the papers of suspicious individuals. You can say: “you look suspicious 
to me.” That’s it! The life goes on!136
As these quotes show, Pronin’s order of 2003 proved ineffective at curbing the 
arbitrary abuse by police of their power to stop individuals and search for administrative 
violations. Yet in August 2005, the Minister of the Interior endorsed the same message 
in his address to all police forces under the Ministry of the Interior, instructing them to 
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“give up arbitrary and ungrounded checks of passports, migration cards or other docu-
ments, vehicle or load inspections, unsanctioned searches. . . unless there is a legal 
reason to do so.”137 The Moscow Metro Monitoring Study conducted during and after 
this statement was made reveals that the Minister’s words have indeed rung hollow.
A Corrupt and Inept Police Force
Pervasive ethnic profiling and abuse of power by police are occurring in the context of a 
police system in crisis. A permissive legal framework places too much discretion in the 
hands of individual police in spite of legal guarantees protecting against discrimination. 
In the absence of any effective complaints or disciplinary mechanisms, the police know 
they can act with impunity.  
As a result, today’s Russian police forces are ineffective in achieving their true 
mission: protecting public safety. Police are held accountable only for meeting centrally 
designated targets for arrests and referrals for prosecution. Under a new reporting sys-
tem adopted in 2002,138 superiors review the “dynamics of indicators,” meaning that 
whereas good policing should result in an environment of safety in which fewer crimes 
occur and fewer criminals are arrested, the current system in fact encourages police 
to report an increase in arrests, investigations, and referrals for prosecution. A recent 
study by the Russian organization Demos reported that many police officers meet their 
targets through arbitrary arrests and even by falsifying data.139 One officer described his 
frustration at his inability to spend time investigating serious crimes:
  There is a lot of evidence, the damage is high, but [the investigation] will take time. . . At the 
end of the month, however, what you need is detection rates, the points. So you get down to 
catching small fry, such as bus drivers who fail to give out tickets [when they receive the fare 
from passengers]. You deal with little things, while serious crimes lose priority.140
Arbitrary police practices and the acceptance of racist and discriminatory polic-
ing are perpetuated when new recruits adopt the policing habits and attitudes of their 
superiors.141 Polls reveal that police officers’ acceptance of the use of force is high, and 
their negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities, particularly those from the Cauca-
sus, run deep. Regarding use of force, a recent poll revealed that 63% of police officers 
believed that it is acceptable to use physical force against criminal suspects.142 This same 
poll provides interesting insight into ethnic prejudice by the police. On the one hand, 
the attitude of police toward slogans like “Russia for [ethnic] Russians” is less popular 
among police officers than amongst the general Russian public. (Whereas 51% of police 
officers condemn such attitudes, only 23% of Russians do and while 39% of police offi-
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cers support that attitude, 53% of Russians do.) The poll reveals, however, that the police 
have stronger negative attitudes towards “Caucasians” than the Russian public: 67% of 
police officers polled said they are suspicious, irritated, and fearful of Caucasians, while 
47% of Russians polled expressed similar attitudes.143
As of January 1, 2006, salaries for the police increased by 15% so that a police 
officer now receives a salary of $350 a month, while a rank-and-file policeman receives 
$265 a month.144 A poll by the Levada Center yielded interesting results regarding cor-
ruption in the police. Of the police officers polled, 90% believed that their salaries are 
insufficient and 80% admitted that they supplemented their police salaries through 
other means. When the poll asked the officers to describe the various ways they supple-
mented their income, 28% declined to answer. Other answers yielded the following list: 
58% serving as security guards, 36% giving lifts, 18% “informal” services, 17% “informal 
fines,” 14% bribes and “presents.” The polling agency commented that these results 
might be underreporting the prevalence of corruption either because of respondents’ 
fear of self incrimination or because corruption is so mundane and accepted, respon-
dents would not feel compelled to report it. On the other hand, the agency commented 
that their data might exaggerate the prevalence of corruption if police officers ascribe 
corruption to their superior.145
Unsurprisingly, public trust in the police is low and recent polls indicate that it 
is falling further. The recent Demos study cites various polls indicating that about 40% 
of the population has consistently held a negative view of police performance over the 
past 10 years.146 A poll conducted in September 2005, however, revealed that 65% of 
the Russian population does not trust the police. According to that same poll, Russians 
fear the police almost as much as they fear terrorists and criminals: 33% of respondents 
fear attacks of street gangsters; 29% fear terrorist attacks; 28% fear falling victim to 
interethnic conflicts and mass slaughter; and 26% fear police abuse. Three out of four 
Russians polled expressed fear that they would fall victim to abuse by police forces.147 
One year after the tragic Beslan school hostage-crisis, 65% of Russians polled believed 
that the authorities are unable to protect them from terrorist attacks.148
In sum, a permissive legal framework allows police officers to conduct stops at 
their discretion based on any suspicion of a crime or administrative violation. Random 
stops to uncover administrative violations of improper residence registration are a prime 
area of police abuse. Ethnic minorities are the prime suspects and victims of this policy 
and the situation has only worsened for them since 1999 when the Moscow government 
took a stronger counter-terrorist stance.
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VII. Conclusion
Ethnic profiling by police in Moscow has long been recognized, yet until now its perva-
siveness has not been quantified.  
The goal of the Moscow Metro Monitoring Study was to scientifically determine 
whether and to what extent ethnic profiling occurs. This survey confirms conventional 
wisdom and anecdotal reports of the incidence of ethnic profiling. The study documents 
the highest odds ratio proving the disproportionate targeting of ethnic minorities by 
police ever detected through similar studies. While non-Slavs make up only 4.6% of 
the riders on the Metro system, they are on average 21.8 times more likely to be stopped 
by the police than Slavs. This discrepancy is so high that it is unlikely that it can be 
explained on non-discriminatory, legitimate law enforcement grounds. 
Yet the study results also prove that the current discriminatory stop practice is 
ineffective at detecting and preventing crime. The study revealed a 3% hit rate in which 
the greatest offense that the police uncovered was the administrative violation of main-
taining improper residence or immigration registration. In light of the serious concerns 
regarding crime and terrorism in Moscow today, the Ministry of the Interior can ill 
afford to turn a blind eye to these results and allow the police to continue their current 
practices.
The structure, organization, and policy directives of the federal police in general 
and the Moscow police (the Chief Moscow GUVD and the separate UVDs) in particular 
are untransparent. The federal and Moscow police have failed to provide any public 
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safety rationale for the police forces’ discriminatory and disproportionate targeting of 
ethnic minorities. Ethnic profiling is doubly destructive: not only does it undermine the 
rule of law, but as the study documents, it interferes with legitimate investigations and 
the prevention of serious crime.
Furthermore, the legal framework governing the authority that police officers have 
to conduct stops and document checks must be refined. The current ambiguous stan-
dards provide a veneer of legality to abuse by police officers. Objective criteria must be 
developed to provide police officers with clear guidelines that define the circumstances 
in which suspicion is reasonable. The development of more precise rules should also be 
accompanied by the creation of review mechanisms that can govern the standardization 
of objective decision-making regarding police stops and investigations.
The study reveals the public’s ambivalence toward the police. Of the individu-
als monitored, a large percentage agreed to be interviewed, thereby providing valuable 
insights into the attitudes of Moscow Metro riders. Surprisingly, 89% of the respondents 
commented that the police treated them courteously during their stops. Respondents 
were evenly split between those who believed that the police were doing their job in 
stopping them and those who described the stops in negative terms. Perhaps because 
the Moscow Metro Monitoring Study was not designed to measure corruption, the study 
failed to detect widespread corruption. This area merits further research. Despite polls 
and extensive documentation of the public’s negative attitudes towards the police, the 
study yielded ambiguous findings, which mirror those of a recent independent poll.149
The Moscow Metro Monitoring Study proves beyond a reasonable doubt that non-
Slavs are treated differently from Slavs and that the Moscow police are engaging in 
unlawful discrimination in violation of the Russian Constitution and Russia’s interna-
tional legal obligations. Russian NGOs and the international community must engage 
the Russian authorities to amend legislation and reform the police to end this odious 
and illegal practice.
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Notes
1. Throughout this report, the terms “ethnicity,” “nationality,” and “race” are used interchange-
ably in the sense of Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD).
2. The SOVA Center has conducted a multi-year study of hate speech and racist violence 
reported in the Russian media. Its findings are available at http://xeno.sova-center.ru/213716E/
21728E3/63371DF.
3. See European Court of Human Rights, Timishev v. Russia, Applications Nos. 55762/00 and 
55974/00 (13 December 2005).
4. Timishev v. Russia, para. 54. 
5. In reaching its decision, the European Court recalled two foundational definitions of dis-
crimination in international norms. It cited Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination: 
[T]he term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or prefer-
ence based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or 
any other field of public life.
 It also cited the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 
(ECRI) General Policy Recommendation no. 7, defining “racial discrimination” as:
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(b) ‘direct racial discrimination’ shall mean any differential treatment based on a ground 
such as race, colour, language, religion, nationality or national or ethnic origin, which has 
no objective and reasonable justification . . . 
(c) ‘indirect racial discrimination’ shall mean cases where an apparently neutral factor such 
as a provision, criterion or practice cannot be as easily complied with by, or disadvantages, 
persons belonging to a group designated by a ground such as race, colour, language, religion, 
nationality or national or ethnic origin, unless this factor has an objective and reasonable 
justification . . . 
 By virtue of Article 15 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, all duly ratified inter-
national treaties are binding law in Russia.
6. Founded in 2003, JURIX, or “Jurists for Constitutional Rights and Freedoms,” is a nonprofit, 
nonpartisan organization of lawyers specializing in constitutional and public interest law. Its pro-
grams focus on strategic litigation, legal education and research, and capacity-building. An overview 
of its programs can be found in Russian at http://www.jurix.ru and in English at http://www.jurix.
ru/en/index_eng.htm#.
7. The Justice Initiative is an operational program of the Open Society Institute that promotes 
rights-based law reform and strengthens legal capacity worldwide. Justice Initiative projects shape 
policy and achieve concrete results through hands-on technical assistance, litigation, advocacy, 
knowledge-dissemination and network-building. In its Equality & Citizenship program, the Justice 
Initiative addresses the shared vulnerabilities of racial/ethnic minorities and non-citizens. An over-
view of its programs can be found at http://www.justiceinitiative.org.
8. Lamberth Consulting is the recognized leader in conducting studies of profiling. Its techni-
cal expert, Dr. John Lamberth, designed the methodology employed in profiling cases described in 
Section III. An overview of the work of Lamberth Consulting can be found at http://www.lamberth-
consulting.com.
9. Because there were so few “others” observed when the population of the Moscow Metro was 
assessed (0.5%), their numbers were combined with those in the category of “minorities” and the 
results were used to calculate the difference in treatment between “Slavs” and “non-Slavs.” It should 
be noted that 3.9% of those stopped by the police were classified as “others,” indicating that they 
were overstopped by the police, but not as egregiously as “minorities.”
10. In the United States, for example, police officers are allowed to stop and perform a limited 
search of individuals by patting them down outside their clothing, known as a “frisk,” when they 
have reasonable, fact-based, articulable suspicion that the suspect is engaged in a crime and may be 
armed and dangerous. See Terry v. Ohio, 368 U.S. 1 (1968). In the United Kingdom, the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 gives police officers the power to stop and search anyone in public 
when they have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect possesses stolen or criminal articles. See 
U.K. Home Office (2003) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (s.66) Code of Practice A on Stop 
and Search; see also Richard Keenan, Stop and Search: the Leicestershire Experience, in JUSTICE INITIA-
TIVES, at 82 (June 2005).  
11. C. Willis, THE USE, EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF POLICE STOP AND SEARCH POWERS, RPUP 
15, at 22 (London Home Office 1983).
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12. According to the study, although blacks and Asians were more likely to be subject to stops 
and searches than whites, the arrest rate for these groups were 11.1% for whites, 11.7% for blacks, 
and 9.4% for Asians.  See Marian FitzGerald, STOP AND SEARCH: INTERIM REPORT (London Metropoli-
tan Police 1999).
13. A judicial inquiry into this investigation concluded that London’s Metropolitan police force 
was “institutionally racist.”  REPORT OF AN INQUIRY BY SIR WILLIAM MACPHERSON OF CLUNY,  Cmd 
4262-I (London HMSO 1999).
14. Section 19B(I) of the 1976 Race Relations (Amendment) Act, as amended in 2000, now 
provides: “It is unlawful for a public authority in carrying out any functions of the authority to do 
any act which constitutes public discrimination.”  The Preamble of the Act makes clear that the 
purpose of the 2000 amendment was to “extend further the application of the Race Relations Act of 
1976 to the police and other public authorities. . . ” See id, available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/
acts2000/00034-a.htm#I. For an overview of ethnic profiling measures in the United Kingdom, see 
Joel Miller, Measuring and Understanding Minority Experiences of Stop and Search in the UK, in JUSTICE 
INITIATIVES, at 53 (June 2005).
15. See David A. Harris, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION’S HIGHWAYS, 
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criminal activity or contraband.  See David Kocieniewski, Success of Elite Police Unit Exacts a Toll 
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Home Office 2004); P.A.J. Waddington, et al., In Proportion: Race and Police Stop and Search, 44 
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E T H N I C  P R O F I L I N G  I N  T H E  M O S C O W  M E T R O    61
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tional Supervision ruled the propiska system illegal. See Conclusion of the Committee of the Con-
stitutional Review of the U.S.S.R. of October 26, 1990 entitled On Legislation Governing Propiska of 
Citizens. See also Amnesty International, Rough Justice: The Law and Human Rights in the Russian 
Federation, 36 (AI Index: EUR 46/054/2003) (hereinafter Rough Justice).
63. See Law on Freedom of Movement, Law No. 5242-1 adopted on June 25, 1993 (amended Nov. 
4, 2004).
64. See Law on Freedom of Movement, Art. 3.
65. See Regulations Concerning Registration and Deregistration of Citizens of the Russian Federation, 
adopted by Decree No. 713 (July 17, 1995) (amended Dec. 22, 2004), Art. 16.
66. See id., Art. 6.
67. See Federal Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation, No. 115-FZ 
adopted 25 July 2002 (amended Nov. 2, 2004), Art. 20(1).
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and public security forces. See Law on the Police, Law No. 1026-1 of April 18, 1991 (amended May 
2005).
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of Internal Affairs, Head Administration, Administration of Internal Affairs of the Subject of the Russian 
Federation (Sept. 15, 2003).
84. A full list of departments and police forces that fall under the authority of the Ministry of 
Interior is available at http://www.mvd.ru/?docid=16. According to the President’s order from Octo-
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86. See generally http://www.mosmetro.ru.
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page=382.
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